Many application fields use computer-controlled systems, with different levels of criticality requirements. A common characteristic of such embedded systems is their increasing complexity in intrinsic terms-distribution management, redundancy, functionality layering, and so on-and of their in-the-field operation-environmental interfaces, timing constraints, controlled application criticality, and so on. Designers rarely completely master this increasing complexity. Usual design practices often suffer from partial approaches, overlooked details, inadequate modeling, insufficient prototyping, and limited design tools or available techniques. With these shortcomings, designs often end up addressing incorrect, incomplete, or misunderstood user requirementsoften the main cause of a design's or system's final failure. 1 A full solution to this situation is far away, but solving these problems requires development and testing of design processes. Improved processes need to address the entire system and integrate as many relevant requirements as possible, including interactions with the environment. The current disciplines of hardware, firmware, software, and application engineering-commonly considered as separate-must evolve toward a system engineering discipline. This system engineering must encompass all previous approaches to provide the reliability expected from systems that control critical environments. 2 This integrated discipline should encompass the following:
• An interdisciplinary approach to satisfy user needs. Computer engineers need to interact with other engineers (such as mechanical or chemical), system users, and society to understand their needs. These requirements would include environmental, legal, and ethical considerations.
• The evolution and verification of product and process designs. The quality of a product design depends on the quality of the process that produces it. Manufacturers must verify the qualities of both product and process design; the product-in-aprocess approach is an evolutionary one that must account for changes and modifications.
• An integrated and best-balanced set of product and process designs. Integration and balance of these items are crucial points. Providing these qualities requires some sort of verifiable compositionality property of components that contributes to the system's total quality from the viewpoints of structure, functionality, nonfunctional properties, and interaction. The concept of verifiable compositionality is completely different from-and much more demanding than-the usual approach based on composition of building blocks. It implies the preservation of properties (either structural, functional, or nonfunctional) and the ability to verify them.
Validation of dependable system design
The increasing complexity of computer-controlled systems has exposed the limits of the validation techniques-such as code review, testing, fault trees, and failure mode error analysis-traditionally used in industry to cope with these systems' increasingly demanding dependability requirements. Moreover, new technologies such as object-oriented design and programming, advanced user interfaces, hardware-software codesign, and commercial offthe-shelf software components present new challenges for the validation process. Traditional validation techniques are increasingly complemented with advanced validation techniques, such as formal verification, modelbased dependability evaluation, schedulability analysis, and fault injection. These techniques aren't intended to replace traditional validation techniques but to integrate with them.
Formal verification
Formal verification is a hot topic especially for the development of dependable embedded systems. The use of formal methods for the specification and verification of system properties is one methodological improvement in the system production process. Together with other techniques, formal methods can make it possible to reach high-quality standards. International standards and guidelines increasingly require use of formalmethods for the development of safety-critical computer-controlled systems.
Formal methods are mathematically based techniques that can offer a rigorous and effective way to model, design, and analyze computer systems. They have been a research topic for many years and the question now is whether system designers can effectively use them in industrial applications. Tool support is necessary for a fully industrial-strength process, and designers need improved integration of formal methods with other software engineering practices.
Researchers have proposed several approaches to using formal methods in the development process. The proposed methods differ in the degree of the method's involvement within the development process, the simplest being the mere practice of writing rigorous specifications. Industry acceptance of formal methods is strictly related to the investment needed to introduce them, the maturity of available tools, and the ease of using these techniques and tools. Designers often prefer a graphical representation, even at the cost of losing some formality. So, despite some success in using development processes built around a specific formal method, the industrial trend is currently toward the use of graphical specification formalisms. The Specification and Description Language (SDL) is a notable example. 3 We roughly classify formal verification methods and tools into two categories: socalled proof-and model-theoretical approaches. In proof-theoretical approaches, designers model the system state in terms of settheoretical structures on which they define invariants. They model operations on the state by specifying the operations' pre-and postconditions in terms of system state. Invariants must be proved-by means of theorem proving-to hold through the system's execution.
Model-theoretical approaches, on the other hand, work on a finite state representation of system behavior. In these approaches, designers usually conduct verification by applying model-checking algorithms or equivalence relations over the system model to check desired properties. In particular, designers might express safety requirements as temporal-logic formulas and check these requirements on the system model. Model-theoretical approaches provide a direct and automatic verification method of system properties.
Unfortunately In contrast, proof-theoretic approaches can exploit their generalization capability to avoid the state explosion problem. In general, however, they require more skill in using theoremproving tools, and, therefore, more investment, in terms of designer know-how and training. This experience is necessary because people usually must guide theorem proving, so the process is not totally automatic. Consequently, the proof details cannot be hidden from the tool user. Researchers have recently investigated the integration of model-checking and theorem-proving approaches, 5 which seems to be the most potentially beneficial perspective.
Model-based dependability validation
Besides combinatorial models such as fault trees, researchers have developed many other state-space-based models and tools for dependability modeling and analysis.
The dependability community has widely used modeling based on Markov processes because of this modeling type's powerful representative capabilities. 6 These approaches must face the increasing complexity of systems and, consequently, of models. Queuing networks, stochastic process algebras, 7 and stochastic Petri nets-modeling tools at a higher level than Markov chains-offer a solution. These tools can deal with different abstraction levels of the analysis, still basing model solutions on a direct transformation to Markov models. However, high-level models have advantages in the model generation phase, because they yield compact models even for complex systems, and they often use efficient state space reduction algorithms in the solution phase as well.
Approaches based on Petri nets models are becoming popular because they offer appealing graphical visualization of the models and because of the natural way in which the formalism represents concurrency, competition, and synchronization. Researchers augmented basic Petri nets to perform quantitative analysis of performance and dependability attributes, first with stochastic Petri nets (SPN) and later with generalized stochastic Petri nets (GSPN). 8 The stochastic process underlying SPN and GSPN models is a discrete-space, continuous-time, homogeneous Markov process. Further, stochastic activities networks 9 and the stochastic reward nets 10 are GSPN extensions that do not increase the representative power but provide useful shorthand notations to concisely represent complex dependencies among model elements. Many tools based on these formalisms (such as Ultra-SAN, Stochastic Petri Net Package, and others) provide dependability modeling and automated evaluation of dependability attributes.
Researchers have proposed other classes of Petri nets with an underlying stochastic process that is not a simple Markov process. These include deterministic and stochastic Petri nets 11 and Markov regenerative stochastic Petri nets. 12 These methods, however, still lack efficient solution algorithms and fully automated evaluation tools.
The quantitative analysis of a computer system's dependability attributes using stochastic modeling is a process that requires ability and experience. Building the system model requires assumptions, simplifications, and abstractions whose impact on the final results cannot be estimated beforehand. Also, slight variations in a crucial parameter's value might dramatically change the final measures.
Analytical models have usually targeted particular mechanisms or specific parts of the systems. When designers use analytical models for modeling entire complex systems, 13, 14 several problems occur, such as subtle interactions between hardware and software, model stiffness, and state explosion. Despite the modularity in defining the model, the analysis has to solve the model in its entirety to maintain the Markovian properties. Therefore, models of real-even rather simple-systems tend to be abstract and usually do not account for all details.
Schedulability analysis
Embedded systems are often real-time systems that can exhibit timing faults, typically caused by executing too many different tasks with limited computational resources. The main validation activity is the search for a feasible schedule. Researchers have studied scheduling for a long time, and many schemes for static and some for dynamic scheduling exist.
Designers validate such systems by making many often unrealistic assumptions. For this reason, few commercial tools support schedulability analysis. Only recently, tools like the Prototyping Environment for Real-Time Systems (PERTS), now called Rapid RMA (for rate monotonic analysis; see http://www.tripac. com/html/products.html), and TimeWiz (http://www.timesys.com) have supplemented the available low-level debugging or executiontracing tools with schedulability analysis.
What is still missing is an overall integrated design environment that lets designers, within a coherent design methodology, evaluate the impact of different priority schemes and scheduling algorithms on design-level, real-time system performance and functionality. The hard real-time-hierarchical object-oriented design (HRT-HOOD) 15 methodology takes a step in this direction by explicitly addressing the design of hard real-time systems in an objectbased framework and providing a means for verifying their performance.
Validation based on fault injection
Fault injection is an experimental activity complementing the analytical techniques previously described and aims at testing the system behavior in the presence of faults. Fault injection campaigns contribute to fault forecasting by studying either error propagation and latency or the coverage of fault tolerance mechanisms. Despite many studies dealing with coverage and latency, only a few attacked them in a unified way. 16 Fault injection is particularly good at revealing those imperfections causing a loss of fault coverage, which arise from the incorrect definition and application of the mechanisms, with respect to the considered fault assumptions. Estimating the fault assumptions' coverage requires other types of analyses.
Designers must consider two main criteria-the system abstraction level and the form of injection-for the experimental validation of fault-tolerant systems. In considering the system abstraction level, it is possible to distinguish between cases in which a physical system is available and cases in which a simulation model describes the system's structure and/or behavior.
The form of injection can be either physical or logical. In physical fault injection, designers inject faults directly into physical components through mechanical or electromagnetic alterations. In logical injection, designers alter Boolean variables or data in the system.
Most studies on physical injection used pinlevel injection, although some studies used other techniques like heavy-ion radiation for specific systems. Sometimes, uncertainty exists as to the ability of a pin injection to accurately represent a particular fault. Another main problem is that higher integration levels and clock rates make accessing the physical components themselves more difficult. Hybrid injection-injecting faults at the logical level of the physical components-provides the main solution to these problems.
Designers can also apply fault injection at a more abstract level. 6 They can inject specific, anticipated faults in the formal specification to check that the system satisfies given correctness properties, even in case of faults.
Needs for integration of validation
Today, these validation techniques remain separate and are not at all integrated; that is, each technique requires defining a particular system model. Such a model focuses on technique-specific aspects, and has no relation with models defined for other validation techniques. In a coherent system approach, applying these techniques cannot be a juxtaposition of unrelated techniques, but must integrate techniques by using different but semantically related models.
Two recent European projects-Guards and HIDE-address this need.
Guards validation framework
Guards, a European Economic Community Esprit project, aims to design and develop a Generic Upgradeable Architecture for RealTime Dependable Systems, together with an associated development and validation environment. 5 The intent is to configure instances of a generic architecture that can meet the diverse requirements of critical real-time application domains. The cost of validation and certification of instances of the architecture thus becomes a critical factor. The effort to reduce this cost has exploited reuse of alreadyvalidated components in different instances, supported software components of different criticality, and focused validation obligations on a minimum set of critical components.
The Guards validation strategy considered both the short-term goal of validating the architecture's design principles and the longterm goal of validating instances of the architecture for specific requirements. Different methods, techniques, and tools contributed to these validation objectives. Figure 1 depicts the validation environment 17 that supports this strategy and illustrates the relationships among components and their interactions with the architecture development environment. Figure 1 explicitly identifies the main validation components: formal verification, modelbased evaluation, fault injection, and the methodology and supporting tool set for schedulability analysis. The figure also highlights the complementary use of the validation components. In particular, fault injection carried out on prototypes complements the other validation components. It provides ways to assess the validity of the necessary assumptions made by the formal-verification tasks and to estimate the coverage parameters included in the analytical models for dependability evaluation.
Formal verification
The Guard project used formal approaches for specification and as a design aid. The project applied formal approaches to verify critical dependability mechanisms-namely, clock synchronization, interactive consistency, fault diagnosis, and multilevel integrity. The first three mechanisms constitute basic building blocks of the architecture, and the fourth one corresponds to a major Guard innovation.
The formal approaches applied included both theorem proving and model checking, and the verification of clock synchronization relied heavily on the Prototype Verification System (PVS). This verification work led to a general theory for averaging and nonaveraging synchronization algorithms. 5 The verification work concerning interactive consistency, fault diagnosis, and multilevel integrity was based on model checking using the Just Another Concurrency Kit tool set and on the framework introduced by Bernardeschi, Fantechi, and Simoncini 6 to deal with dependable systems.
Model-based dependability evaluation
Model-based dependability evaluation in the Guards context posed several of the modeling problems discussed earlier (stiffness, combinatorial explosion, and so on). To master these problems, the project carried out differ- ent modeling activities, choosing modeling details and levels to fit specific evaluation objectives. 5 Some models addressed several issues concerning the analysis of generic mechanisms and of specific features for selected instances; for example, phased missions for space prototype instances and intrachannel error detection for railway prototype instances.
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An incremental approach proposing modular constructs established a baseline set of models for the architecture's prototype instances. A general notation enabled a consistent interpretation of model parameters (layers, correlated faults, and so on), and guided the choice of a particular instantiation of the architecture, according to the end-user application's dependability requirements. Detailed models allowed a more comprehensive analysis of the instances' behavior. Although researchers in each area used different tools, they based all modeling on stochastic Petri nets to allow reuse of the results.
Schedulability analysis
The design and development of a Guards software application exploits an HRT design method based on the HRT-HOOD structural design method. HRT-HOOD also addresses the problem of designing replicated, fault-tolerant architectures where several computing and communication boards interact to consolidate input values and output results.
To address the design of distributed systems, Guards extended HRT-HOOD to include the concept of virtual nodes. The method maps application tasks (HRT objects) onto the infrastructure architecture. The tasks are coupled with the real-time models of the selected components to analyze and verify their schedulability properties.
The temporal properties analysis tool set includes a schedulability analyzer and a scheduler simulator. The Guards project enhanced these tools to provide a more precise and realistic analysis by having them account for the concept of thread offsets. The enhanced tools also cope with the specific needs of a redundant fault-tolerant architecture by allowing the analysis of the interactions over the interchannel communication network. Furthermore, on the basis of real-time models produced by the verification tools, they deterministically schedule the critical interactions among software functions on different channels. The tools automatically produce the transfer slots allocated to the interactions and a set of predefined exchange tables.
Fault injection
Guards considered fault injection an experimental verification activity for use on prototype instances. Fault injection use had two main objectives:
• to complement the formal verification of mechanisms, which made behavioral and structural abstractions on the failure mode assumptions; and • to support the development of Guards instances by assessing their overall behavior in the presence of faults, in particular by estimating coverage and latency for the built-in error detection mechanisms.
For cost-effectiveness and flexibility, Guards based the fault injection environment on the software-implemented fault injection (SWIFI) technique. 18 Although the project could have used available tools, albeit with some extensions, it developed a specific fault injection tool set (FITS). Such a tool set supports end users in the development of specific instances of the generic architecture. Besides injecting specific fault or error types, FITS allows synchronizing injections with the target system by monitoring trigger events.
Discussion
A set of advanced techniques form the basis for the Guards validation framework. However, it is apparent that the framework applies the validation techniques separately and with little integration. The only relation linking dependability, formal, and HRT diagram models, for example, are mostly written documents. It was beyond the Guards project's scope to provide a strict integration, which requires a much deeper research effort. One aim of the project was to define a validation environment as a set of support tools (a tool kit) rather than a completely integrated environment, because it was not possible to create a common theoretical framework in which to unify the adopted modeling techniques. In this sense, the Guards validation policy is not so different from current industrial best practices, which apply different techniques to different validation phases. At best, an appropriate requirements-tracing mechanism-sometimes supported by a dedicated tool-links these techniques.
Guards employed more advanced techniques and tools within an overall validation policy to provide wide validation coverage. Further integrating the adopted techniques requires another step: working on the models underlying the different techniques.
HIDE approach to integration of validation
One step toward integrating different validation techniques within a common framework comes from the High-Level Integrated Design Environment for Dependability (HIDE) European Economic Community Esprit Project. 19 HIDE's main objective has been the development of an integrated environment for system design via the Unified Modeling Language (UML). The HIDE project's use of the semiformal notations of UML for describing the entire system under design enables a more integrated validation than in other approaches. UML lets designers develop models for analyses that can assess different properties of interest.
UML is a standard modeling language used for visualizing, specifying, constructing, and documenting aspects or views of systems. 20 Its developers based the language on the objectoriented paradigm. It is heavily graphical, using various diagrams to describe different views of a system. A key part of the HIDE project's philosophy is to assist the practitioner designer by offering a UML interface and to provide translations from the UML notation to mathematical models suitable for different validation types. The designer can easily validate a design, since automatic or semiautomatic translations into the individual mathematical models for the particular validation(s) deal with technicalities. The results of such validations return to the designer as annotations in the original UML model. Usually, each translation focuses on those UML model components relevant to the validation of concern, possibly enriched with some external information needed for the validation itself. Whenever possible, such enrichment is itself modeled using UML.
A first translation maps UML structural diagrams to timed and generalized stochastic Petri nets for dependability assessment. 21 This translation copes with state explosion by starting from simple models, making them more complex and detailed by including refinements of the relevant system parts. The translation tries to capture only the features relevant to dependability, leaving aside all other information. This first translation allows a less detailed but system-wide representation of the analyzed system's dependability characteristics. It also provides preliminary evaluations of the system dependability during early design phases. Using these evaluations, a designer can easily verify whether the system satisfies predefined requirements on dependability attributes.
The translation also deals with various levels of detail, from preliminary abstract UML descriptions to refined specifications of the last design phases. The analysis of UML higher-level models (structural diagrams) helps identify the system's critical parts, which require a more detailed representation. By using well-defined interfaces, such models can include more detailed information from refined UML models of the identified critical system parts.
The UML diagrams that form the input of such transformations do not have formal semantics. Also, the specification this set provides might be incomplete or ambiguous. Therefore, it is not possible to provide a formally correct formalization of the transformation.
The second translation maps a subset of UML statechart diagrams to Kripke structures (or transition systems) for the formal verification of functional properties. 22 This translation defines a reference formal, operational semantics for UML statechart diagrams within HIDE. A useful aspect of such semantics is that they are parametric on some aspects that are not (yet) completely defined for UML. In particular, the semantics for transition priorities are parametric, which is helpful in describing the system behavior under different priority schemes. The operational semantics have proven correct with respect to major requirements established in the UML definition. 23 Researchers have defined a compiler from UML statechart diagrams to Promela and proven the compiler correct. 24 Promela is the input language of the Spin linear-time model checker. 4 The compiler definition is consistent with the semantics definition of statechart diagrams given by Latella, Majzik, and Massink. 22 Gnesi, Latella, and Massink address the problem of branching time model checking. 23 
Beyond HIDE
Although limited in time and scope, the HIDE project provided evidence that an integrated approach to the successful design and validation of dependable systems is not only feasible but also viable. In future work, we will focus on design methodologies and technologies that support automated validation and verification techniques integrated into a UML-based system design process.
Although HIDE focused more on system design and validation technologies, our future work aims at proposing proper design methodologies for dependable real-time systems. We intend to integrate UML notation with a design process and with validation, verification, and evaluation techniques. Our goal is an easy-to-use, vendor-independent, and open logical framework for ensuring a proven quality of service for dependable, real-time systems. The design process will guide the design and validation of embedded real-time dependable systems for all participants, including potential customers, developers, and managers. It has to cover all the special needs of a dependable, embedded, real-time application during its life cycle, including system maintenance during its operational life. Adaptation or extension of existing processes is necessary to fulfill the special needs for design and validation strategies related to the target field of dependability. Support for fault tolerance is necessary via the inclusion of design patterns from a library of stereotyped UML classes.
We will further pursue research on formal verification as initiated by HIDE, because the use of formal methods for proving the correctness of systems is an essential methodological improvement in system development. This improvement will help ensure high-quality designs. We will also provide intrinsic support for integrating a variety of transformationbased evaluation methods for quantitative validation of system dependability concepts, such as performance, reliability, and availability.
We intend to maintain a transformational approach, since it proved adequate in HIDE. The transformations must automatically derive all mathematical models from the target system's UML specification. They must hide most of the background mathematics from the designer, eliminating the need for both a specific expertise in abstract mathematics and the tedious remodeling of the system for mathematical analysis. Moreover, our system will automatically back annotate the results from mathematical analysis for presentation into the UML model. This capability provides the designer with a source of precious information for making subsequent design choices.
The highly open integration framework exhaustively uses standard formats for interfacing UML tools and mathematical analysis packages. This way, a single and comprehensive framework will integrate all the tools necessary to uniformly evaluate all aspects of dependability. Moreover, a well-defined mechanism for integrating new transformations will support extending basic sets of transformations by arbitrary, domain-specific transformations.
Among techniques for the formal verification of UML models, the model checking approach is attractive because it involves a low degree of interaction with the model designer. In this technique, designers also write the constraints to be checked using suitable logical extensions of the UML Object Constraint Language (OCL).
Besides investigating model checking in the context of OCL and general UML models, our studies particularly emphasize modelchecking techniques and tools for a behavioral subset of UML statechart diagrams. We foresee these diagrams playing a major role in the detailed functional specification of dependable real-time systems. Toward that end, we will define general and efficient representations for the formal semantics of UML statechart diagrams to use with several model checkers.
We will also investigate alternative approaches to model checking-like those based on networks of automata-analyzing their semantic implications. Transformations of quantitative extensions of UML statechart diagrams to mod-els like timed/stochastic/hybrid automata are also promising. These models lend themselves to automatic verification by means of deterministic-time model checking, stochastic-time model checking, and discrete simulation. 25 Concerning quantitative evaluation, we follow an approach based on transformations from UML subsets to timed and generalized stochastic Petri nets by integrating the Petri nets into UML's object-oriented modeling paradigm. A first transformation aims to map UML structural diagrams-use case, class, object, and deployment diagrams-to timed and generalized stochastic Petri nets for dependability assessment. This approach aims to cope with state explosion by starting from simple models and making them more complex and detailed by refining the relevant system parts.
Another transformation will focus on a UML dynamic model consisting of statecharts and sequence diagrams. It aims to derive generalized stochastic Petri nets from the subset of UML consisting of use cases, sequence diagrams, and so-called guarded statecharts. Guarded statecharts are suited for modeling dependable embedded systems with nondeterministic behavior. Another transformation from (a subset of ) UML to stochastic models will focus on stochastic model-checking techniques for UML.
We developed a common language for describing these transformations and supporting their implementation in the integrated environment, which relays this information using a graphical editor. We will use deductive database technology for the implementation. When fully implemented, this approach can validate systems like Guards, provided designers undertake the effort to describe the entire system in UML.
Discussion
A first, maybe obvious, benefit of an integrated approach is that integration brings homogeneity and uniformity, which, in turn, help manage complexity. The possibility of having a unique system model to which designers can reference during different phases of system design certainly helps the designers deal with all technical aspects, and also with documentation issues. This is especially true when the modeling technique lets designers define different views on the system, as is the case with the UML. All this is even more beneficial because it makes it easier to compare different designs, and thus to evaluate alternative design approaches to the system. HIDE has opened further views of the system in the form of functions to proper validation domains.
The driving philosophy of HIDE, although attractive in theory, still needs experimental evidence, which is the aim of our future work. The use of an automatic (or semiautomatic) translation may suffer from low efficiency. It is extremely difficult to automatically generate validation models, which are as efficient in terms of size as those generated manually by skilled experts. One way to tackle this problem is to use powerful optimization techniques in the representation of validation models.
Another issue is the level of integration. In the HIDE experience, the end level was not very high. Different translations usually work on different kinds of UML diagrams, that is, on different views, and there is not much integration between different mappings. This level of integration is not enough. Allowing the specification of functional as well as nonfunctional aspects within the same kind of diagrams to derive integrated models for different validations would increase the integration level.
The possibility of having both functional and quantitative aspects of a critical part of a system within the same notation is extremely interesting and convenient since it fills the gap that usually separates formal verification from quantitative validation. Usually, these two aspects of dependability assessment make reference to completely different models, and there is no proven guarantee that such models are consistent in some sense. Enriched notations equipped with enriched semantic models might provide rigorous definitions of consistency and related formal proofs. The advantage of applying such an approach to statechart diagrams is that these diagrams naturally offer simple and effective compositionality as well as abstraction mechanisms.
Compositionality lets time and probability information be assigned locally to the components of concern, leaving the composition of such information to the semantics definition (the translation function). However, compositionality appears to be a difficult property to achieve in the context of modelbased dependability validation. A composition of Markovian models is possible by simply connecting submodels, but a hierarchical composition loses the Markovian property. To achieve hierarchical compositionality, it is necessary to resort to more powerful formalisms, such as Markov regenerative processes, that require techniques and tools to limit and control state explosion.
Abstraction is even more important. It is simply unthinkable to have a detailed model of system behavior enriched with quantitative information because of the model's prohibitive size. It is important to produce abstractions of system components such that they are correct with respect to behavioral semantics and preserve the nonfunctional properties of such components. This way, one can specify different (critical) components separately, translate them into the enriched semantic models, build conservative abstractions of those models, and compose them with the (abstract) models of other components. The use of proper behavioral relations developed in the context of process algebra and automata theory, like bisimulation and its quantitative extensions, can be useful for formally dealing with such abstractions. Additionally, proper techniques, like abstract interpretation may also help designers. 26 V alidating basic components and combining them into complex systems through an integration process based on compositionality and abstraction will permit reusability, reduce design development costs, and promote rapid prototyping. Such an approach to design validation of complex systems (in particular, dependable ones) is one of the most interesting and challenging frontiers for computer system scientists and engineers. 
